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RUSSELL S. HARRIS, as Executor, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROLLAND H. HARRIS et al., Defendants
and Appellants.

J

[1] Husband and Wife-Management of Community PropertyLimitations on Power of Disposition.-Under Civ. Code, § 172,
declaring that the husband cannot make a gift of the community personal property without the wife's consent, gifts
made without the wife's consent are not void, but are voidable at her instance.
[2] Id.-Management of Community Property-Actions to Avoid
Transfers.-If a wife acts during the continuance of the
community to avoid her husband's gift of community personal
property without her consent, the whole gift will be avoided.
If she acts after the community has been dissolved, the gift
will be avoided to the extent of her half interest in the community property transferred.
[3] Id.-Mana.gement of Community Property-Wife's Interest.In addition to the wife's rights in community property under
Civ. Code, § 161a, defining the respective interests of each
spouse during continuance of the marriage relation as "present,
existing and equal" under the management and control of the
husband, a wife has absolute power of testamentary disposition
over half of such property (Prob. Code, § 201), and Civ. Code,
§ 172, safeguards these rights by precluding dissipation of her
estate without her permission.
[4] Abatement-Death of Party-Survival of Actions.-A cause
of action for the violation of a property right survives the
death of the owner of the right. (Civ. Code, § 954.)
[5] Husband and Wife-Management of Community PropertyActions to Avoid Transfers.-The present interest of a wife in
community property and her right to dispose of one-half by
will being property rights that are invaded by a husband's
gift without her consent, the right to set aside such gifts
[1] Power of either spouse, without consent of other, to make
gift of community property or funds to third party, note, 17
A.L.R.2d 1118. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 72.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Abatement and Revival, § 60; Am.Jur.,
Abatement and Revival, § 80.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 103(5); [2,5,6]
Husband and Wife, § 108; [3J Husband and Wife, § 99; [4J Abatement, § 42; [7-9] Insane Persons, § 39.
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survives the wife's death and may be exercised by her personal representative.
Id.-Management of Community Property-Actions to Avoid
Transfers.-An executor of the estate of n deceased incompetent whose husband gave defendant certain stock without
her consent during her incompetency was entitled to recover
half of the property transferred where consent was not given
by the guardian.
Insane Persons - Guardianship - Allowance of Gifts. - Although neither the general guardian nor a court has the power
to dispose of the ward's property by way of gift, such rigid
principle has its exception where allowances from the surplus
income of the estate of an incompetent person are sought as
donations for charitable and religious purposes and with the
object of carrying out the presumed wishes of such person.
Icl.-Guardianship-Allowances to Next of Kin.-Allowances
from the estate of an incompetent person for the support of
next of kin may be approved on a showing that the incompetent would have made them as suggested. (Prob. Code,
§ 1558.)
Id.-Guardianship-Allowance of Gifts.-A guardian of an incompetent person has no authority to make gifts from the incompetent's estate without prior court permission.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County. Monroe Friedman, Judge. Affirmed.
Action by executor of estate to recover community property
transferred by decedent's deceased husband while decedent
was an adjudged incompetent. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Robert A. Kaiser, Jeremiah F. O'Neill, Jr., and John E.
Nolan for Defendants and Appellants.
Clarence De Lancey, Raymond C. Gericke and Myron A.
Martin for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment for
plaintiff, executor of the estate of Susie Almeda Harris, in
an action to recover community property transferred by her
deceased husband without valuable consideration in violation
of section 172 of the Civil Code.
Plaintiff is th.e son of Marshall C. Harris and Susie Almeda
Harris and the father of defendant Rolland H. Harris. Marshall and Susie Harris were married in 1894. In 1945 Susie
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Insane and Incompetent Persons, § 74.
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Harris made a will leaving all her property to Marshall Harris
if he was living six months after her death. If he was not
then living her property was to go to plaintiff. In 1948 Susie
Harris was adjudged an incompetent, and Marshall Harris
was appointed her guardian. He relinquished the guardianship and was replaced by plaintiff on March 28, 1957. Susie
Harris died on September 26, 1957. Marshall Harris died on
December 10, 1957.
Between 1950 and March 28, 1957, Marshall Harris made
gifts of community property totalling $29,543.76 to defendants. After March 28, 1957, he gave defendants certain
stock, to which the trial court assigned no value, and other
assets valued at $26,665.89. The finding of the trial court that
Susie Harris was incapable of giving her consent to any of
these gifts is amply supported by the record.
Section 172 of the Civil Code provides:" ... [T]he husband
has the management and control of the community per.sonal
property, with like absolute power of disposition, other than
testamentary, as he has of his separate estate; provided, however, that he cannot make a gift of such community personal
property, or dispose of the same without a valuable consideration ... without the written consent of the wife. " [ 1] Gifts
made without the consent of the wife are not void, but are
voidable at the instance of the wife. (Trimble v. Trimble,
219 Cal. 340, 344 [26 P.2d 477] ; Spreckels v. Spreckels, 172
Cal. 775, 784 [158 P. 537].) [2] If the wife acts to avoid
the gift during the continuance of the community, the
whole gift will be avoided. (Britton v. Hammell, 4 Cal.2d
690,692 [52 P.2d 221].) If she acts after the community has
been dissolved, the gift will be avoided to the extent of her
one-half interest in the community property transferred.
(Trimble v. Trimble, supra, p. 347.)
Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot maintain this
action on the ground that the right to avoid gifts made in
violation of section 172 is a right personal to the wife that
does not survive her death and cannot be exercised by her
executor.
Section 161a of the Civil Code defines the interests of husband and wife in community property: "The respective interests of the husband and wife in community property during
continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing and
equal interests under the management and control of the husband as is provided in sections 172 and 172a of the Civil Code.
This section shall be construed as defining the respective

370

HARRIS

v.

HARRIS

[57 C.2d

interests and rights of husband and wife in the commuuity
property." Section 161a applies to all property involved in
this case, for it was enacted in 1927 and the trial eourt found
that the property was all acquired by the cOlllmunity after
1927. [3] In addition to her rights under section 161a,
a wife has absolute power of testamentary disposition over
one-half of such property. (Prob. Code, § 201.) Section 172
safeguards these rights by precluding dissipation of her
estate without her permission. Unlike the present case, Estate
of Blair, 42 Ca1.2d 728, 730-731 [269 P.2d 612], and Estate
of Bunn, 33 Ca1.2d 897, 900 [206 P.2d 635], on which defendants rely, did not involve the invasion of present and existing
property rights or the exercise of a statutory remedy for
such invasion.
[ 4 ] A cause of action for the violation of a property right
survives the death of the owner of the right. (Civ. Code,
§ 954.) The present interest of a wife in community property
and her right to dispose of one-half by will are property
rights that are invaded by a husband's gift without her
consent.. [5] Thus the right to set aside such gifts survives
the death of the wife and may be exercised by her personal
representative_
[6] The record establishes that the gifts made by Marshall
Harris after March 28, 1957, were made without the consent
of Susie Harris. The trial court found that she was incapable
of giving such consent. Nor was it given by plaintiff while he
was her guardian. It could not be given after her death.
Therefore it is clear that plaintiff should recover one-half of
the property transferred after March 28, 1957.
The gifts made between 1950 and March 28, 1957, present
a more difficult question. During this period Marshall Harris
was his wife's guardian. If he had power as her guardian
to give the consent required by section 172 and validly gave
such consent plaintiff cannot set those gifts aside.
[7] Although" 'neither the general guardian nor a
court has the power to dispose of the ward's property by
way of gift' [citation], such rigid principle has its exception
""here allowances from the surplus income of the cstate are
sought as 'donations for charitable and religious purposes'
and with the object of 'carrying out the presumed wishes of'
the incompe [te] nt person [citations]." (Guardianship of Hall,
31 Ca1.2d 157, 168 [187 P.2d 396].) [8] Allowances for
the support of next of kin may also be approved upon a
showing that the incompetent would have made them as
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suggested. (Prob. Code, § 1558; Guardianship of Hall, supra;
Gual'dianship of Hudelsoll, 18 Ca1.2d 401, 403-406 [115 P.2d
805] ; In re Gual'dianship of Brice, 233 Iowa 183, 186-187
[8 N.W.2d 576J; In re Johnson, 111 N.J.Eq. 268, 270 [162
A. 96] ; Matter of Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415, 418-419 [162 N.E.
471, 59 A.L.R. 649J.) [9] A guardian has no authority,
however, to makc such gifts without prior court permission.
(Guardianship of Hall, supra.) Defendants do not claim that
Marshall Harris secured such permission before, or after,
making the contested gifts. Nor have they presented evidence
tending to establish that Susie Harris would have approved
the gifts had she been competent. The pre-March 28, 1957,
gifts, as well as those made after that date, ,vere therefore
made without the consent of Susie Harris as required by
Civil Code section 172. The trial court correctly determined
that plaintiff should recover one-half of all gifts of community
property made by Marshall Harris to defendants between
1950 and his death in 1957.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the judgment for
the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Shoemaker in the opinion
prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal in Harris
v. Harris (Cal.App.), 16 Cal.Rptr. 561, which, so far as necessary for my purposes, reads:
[]. The defendants' first contention on appeal is that the
plaintiff Russell S. Harris, suing as executor of the estate
of Susie Almeda Harris, does not have standing to sue to
recover one-half of the community property transferred to
defendants by Marshall C. Harris. We agree with this contention.
Civil Code, section 172, states (prior to the 1959 amendments), so far as is pertinent: "The husband has the management and control of the community personal property,
with like absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate; provided, however,
that he cannot make a gift of such community personal property, or dispose of the same without a valuable consideration,
or sell, convey, ?r encumber the furniture, furnishings, or
-Brackets together, in this manner [J, are used to indicate deletions
. from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal.
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fittings of the home, or the clothing or wearing apparel of
the wife or minor children that is community, without the
written consent of the wife."
A review of the California decisions involving Civil Code,
section 172, indicates that the husband's transfer of personal
community property, without valuable consideration or without the wife's consent, immediately vests the property in the
donee subject to avoidance by the wife upon proof of facts
necessary to that end. (Spreckels v. Spreckels (1916) 172
Cal. 775, 784 [158 P. 537] ; Trimble v. Trimble (1933) 219
Cal. 340, 344 [26 P.2d 477] ; Mayr v. Arana (1955) 133 Cal.
App.2d 471, 477 [284 P.2d 21].) The wife can set aside the
transfer of the personal property by the husband, which is
without valuable consideration or her consent, in its entirety
during the lifetime of her husband. (Britton v. Hammell
(1935) 4 Ca1.2d 690 [52 P.2d 221].) After his death, the
widow may set aside one-half of the unauthorized transfers
(Trimble v. Trimble, supra), or recover one-half of the value
from her husband's estate. (Fields v. Michael (1949) 91 Cal.
App.2d 443, 448 [205 P.2d 402].)
Weare of the opinion that the right to so avoid a transfer
of community personal property made by the husband in
violation of the statute is, however, personal to the wife, intended so~ely for her benefit and her protection (Italian
American Bank v. Canepa (1921) 52 Cal.App. 619, 621 [199
P. 55] ; Pomper v. Behnke (1929) 97 Cal.App. 628, 638 [276
P. 122]; Blethen v. Pacific M1d. Life Ins. Co. (1926) 198
Cal. 91, 100 [243 P. 431]; Spreckels v. Spreckels, supra;
Schindler v. Schindler (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 597, 603 [2i2
P.2d 566]), although not so personal that a guardian of an
incompetent wife during her lifetime would 110t have the right
to maintain an action on her behalf (Scott v. Au.stin (1922)
57 Cal.App. 553 [207 P. 710]) ; the right being purely pet'sonal to the wife, it must follow that if she, or her guardian
in case of incompetency, fails to act during her lifetime to
invalidate a gift of community personal property, the gift
becomes valid in its entirety. (United States v. Stewart (1959)
270 F.2d 894, '900 [applying California law] ; Mayr v. Arana,
supra; Italian American Bank v. Canepa, supra.) A personal
right, which is not assignable, does not survive the death of
the person entitled to it even if the wife is incompetent and
the guardian has not acted on her behalf during her life.
(Estate of Blair (1954) 42 Ca1.2d 728, 731, 733 [269 P.2d
612].) []
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Hansen v. Bear Film 00., Inc. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 154 [168
P.2d 946], and Pearl v. Pwrl (1918) 177 Cal. 303 [177
P. 845], cited in respondent's reply brief, concern cases
wherein transfers of property were made to parties to be
held in trust for the transferor. However, the court in the case
before us did not find that the defendants held the property
in trust and the citations are inapplicable.
Stafford v. Mat·tinoni (1923) 192 Cal. 724 [221 P. 919],
and Makeig v. United Security Bank ~ Trust 00. (1931)
112 Cal.App. 138 (296 P. 673], also cited in respondent's
reply brief, concern actions for an accounting of community
property which was in the deceased's possession at death, and
do not present the same fact situations as found in this case.
Likewise, Probate Code, section 201, concerning succession of
community property after death, does not affect the husband's
management and control during the lifetime of the parties.
(Trimble v. Trimble, supra, at pp. 340, 345, 346.) []
Schauer, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied March 28,
1962. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
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